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Dred Scott and Intemational Law
MARK W. JANIS*
As we ponder the contemporary debate about the
proper use of international and foreign law in
interpreting U.S. constitutional law, it might be well to
remember that in 1857, the Supreme Court, in its most
infamous judgment, Dred Scott v. Sandford, was
already struggling with the controversy. This Article
looks first at the increasingly hostile position that
international and foreign law took towards slavery in
the period from the American Revolution to our Civil
War. Second, we discuss the nine judicial opinions in
Dred Scott and explain how the judges variously relied
on international and foreign law to defend or attack
slavery and to interpret the U.S. Constitution. The
majority of that sharply divided Court, led by Chief
Justice Taney, unhappily held that African Americans
could never be U.S. citizens and that Congress could
never make slavery illegal in the Western territories,
the first time since Marbury v. Madison that the
Supreme Court used judicial review to strike down an
act of Congress. The Dred Scott judges disagreed,
often emotionally, about whether the increasingly
hostile attitude of international and foreign law
towards slavery could or should affect outcomes in
U.S. constitutional law. Third, and finally, we explore
the lessons of Dred Scott. Most importantly, the case
reminds us that American exceptionalism in
international law and politics helped persuade some
on the Supreme Court to protect our then so-called
"'peculiar institution, " slavery, and to disregard the
progressive development of international and foreign
* William F. Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. The
author would like to thank his research assistants-Brent Houston, Eleanor Michael, and
Shannon Bratt-and law faculty at several colloquia-the University of Connecticut School
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INTRODUCTION
The thoughtful and highly principled American international
lawyer, Dean Harold Hongju Koh, has remarked that "particularly
since World War II... the United States has been criticized for the
gap between its stated human rights principles and its political
actions."' However, well before modern times, there was already
serious criticism of the discordance between America's human rights
rhetoric and our practice. Indeed, probably at no time was the
discordance so great as it was in 1857, when the Supreme Court
rendered its most infamous judgment, Dred Scott v. Sandford.2 What
we might forget today is that a century and a half ago, the judges of
the U.S. Supreme Court were already grappling with the troubled
relationship between the rules of international law and a controversial
American practice, our then "peculiar institution"-slavery. Seven of
the nine judicial opinions in Dred Scott dealt with international law,
some of them at great length. This Article looks at those opinions in
the context of the international law of the day and considers some of
the lessons of Dred Scott. As we cope again with the implications of
our American exceptionalism in foreign policy and international law,
it might well be remembered that some of our international law
exceptionalism was not all that glorious.
I. SLAVERY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is well to remember that by the middle of the Nineteenth
Century, international law had become a recognizable intellectual and
professional discipline in America. It had a definition, a literature, a
1. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46
ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 294 (2002).
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).-
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useful application in government, diplomacy, and the courtroom, and
enthusiastic promoters, some of whom saw it as a utopian path to
world peace.' However, as with any sort of law at any time, mid-
Nineteenth Century American international law did not ordinarily set
out neat answers to important legal and political questions. Rather,
international law provided an accepted mode of discourse. Then, as
now, political and legal issues were discussed and debated, and
sometimes even settled, in its terms. An excellent example of this
was the marshalling of international legal arguments to address the
issue of American slavery.
Slavery posed the problem which more than any other
bedeviled the Nineteenth Century American Republic. For decades,
the division between North and South, between the Free and the Slave
states, threatened to break the United States apart. Finally, with the
1860 election of America's first Republican President, Abraham
Lincoln (1809-1865), slavery, the issue on which the presidential
election had principally been contested, tore out the stitches that
bound the Union. We began our bloodiest and most traumatic war.
Although there were other causes of the Civil War, at root the most
contentious and intractable problem was slavery. As Abraham
Lincoln said in 1858 while running for the Illinois Senate seat held by
Democrat Stephen Douglas (1813-1861), "A house divided against
itself cannot stand... [T]his government cannot endure, permanently
half slave and half free."4  The Civil War decided for abolition.
Slavery, though not all of its legacy, was finally prohibited throughout
all the United States by Constitutional Amendment, the Thirteenth, in
1865.
Though it has been said that slavery "was not considered
illegal under nineteenth-century notions of international law,"5  it
might be more accurate to acknowledge that, though at first the
legality of slavery at international law was grudgingly conceded,
gradually over time slavery was increasingly regarded as illegal. The
attitude of both general international law and most international
lawyers toward slavery became increasingly hostile from the late
Eighteenth Century, when the U.S. Constitution was drafted and
ratified, to the middle Nineteenth Century, when Dred Scott was
3. The emergence of American international law is a story told in MARK W. JANIS,
THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914
(2004).
4. Abraham Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech, June 16, 1858, in AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 213, 214 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 1991).
5. Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of Slavery in American Legal Development, in
SLAVERY AND THE LAW 3, 4 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
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decided and the Civil War fought. To picture late Eighteenth Century
American opinion about slavery and international law, let us turn to
two famous jurists with whom most any American lawyer would have
then been familiar: Emmerich Vattel and Lord Mansfield.
Vattel's The Law of Nations was published in 1758 and soon
replaced Hugo Grotius' great 1625 treatise, The Law of War and
Peace, in the public eye.6 Grotius, reprinted or translated fifty times
between 1625 and 1758, was, in the hundred years after the
publication of Vattel's The Law of Nations, reprinted or translated
only twice.7 Vattel was scornful of the institution of slavery. He
mentioned it slightly and slightingly in Book III "Of War," Chapter
VIII "Of the Rights of Nations in War," section 152. Asking
"whether prisoners of war may be made slaves," Vattel responded:
Is it lawful to condemn prisoners of war to slavery?
Yes, in cases which give a right to kill them, when
they have rendered themselves personally guilty of
some crime deserving of death. The ancients used to
sell their prisoners of war for slaves. They indeed
thought they had a right to put them to death. In every
circumstance, when I cannot innocently take away my
prisoner's life, I have no right to make him a slave. If
I spare his life and condemn him to a state so contrary
to the nature of man, I still continue with him the state
of war. He lies under no obligation to me: for, what is
life without freedom? If any one counts life a favour
when the grant of it is attended with chains, be it so: let
him accept the kindness, submit to the destiny which
awaits him, and fulfill the duties annexed to it. But he
must apply to some other writer to teach him those
duties: there have been authors enough who have
amply treated of them. I shall dwell no longer on the
subject: and indeed that disgrace to humanity is
6. Joseph G. Starke, The Influence of Grotius Upon the Development of International
Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 2 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 162-76
(Charles H. Alexandrowicz ed., 1972) [hereinafter Alexandrowicz].
7. Francis Stephen Ruddy, The Acceptance of Vattel, in Alexandrowicz, supra note 6,
at 177, 178-79. In his new and revised 1834 edition of Vattel, Joseph Chitty stressed
Vattel's "pre-eminent importance" and speculated "that everyone who has attentively read
this work, will admit that he has acquired a knowledge of superior sentiments, and more
important information, than he ever derived from any other work." EMMERICH DEVATTEL,
THE LAWS OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS iii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1834).
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happily banished from Europe.'
By the end of the Eighteenth Century, English common law
had also finally turned against slavery. Until then, of course, Britain
had been one of the leading slave trading states. Indeed, it is Arthur
Nussbaum's opinion that the "disgraceful business" of the slave trade
was only "lifted to the level of international law when England
obtained from Spain under the Peace of Utrecht a monopoly for the
importation of slaves through a special agreement-the Assiento
Convention-and transferred that monopoly to the South Sea
Company. ' It is estimated that British traders brought over two
million black slaves to America between 1680 and 1786.10
The most notable turning point in the attitude of Eighteenth
Century English common law towards slavery was Lord Mansfield's
judgment in Somerset v. Stewart." The decision came late in
America's colonial period, June 22, 1772, just a little more than four
years before the Declaration of Independence, the date on which we
ordinarily mark the formal separation of the American and English
common law systems and, hence, the end of American formal reliance
on English judicial precedent. It is interesting to speculate whether
Mansfield's judgment might have encouraged Southern planters to
join the Revolution.
The facts are these. James Somerset, taken as a slave from
Africa, was sold to Charles Stewart in Virginia. Somerset
accompanied Stewart to England where, by force, Stewart had
Somerset put aboard Captain Knowles' vessel to be shipped to
Jamaica as a slave and again to be sold. A writ of habeas corpus was
brought wherein Somerset pleaded for his freedom before the court.
12
Francis Hargrave and Alleyne, attorneys for Somerset, argued
not only that slavery was illegal in England but that it violated natural
law. As Hargrave put it:
The question on Stewart's supposed property right is
not whether slavery is lawful in the colonies, (where a
concurrence of unhappy circumstances has caused it to
8. EMMERICH DEVATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 356-57 (G.G.
& J. Robinson eds., 1797).
9. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 128 (1954).
10. Stephan Verosta, History of the Law of Nations 1648-1815, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 160, 166 (1984).
11. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
12. Id.
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be established as necessary;) but whether in England?
Not whether it ever has existed in England; but
whether it be not now abolished?
It is very doubtful whether the laws of England will
permit a man to bond himself by contract to serve for
life; certainly will not suffer him to invest another man
with despotism, nor prevent his own right to dispose of
property. If disallowed by consent of parties, much
more when by force; if made void when commenced
here, much more when imported
In England, where freedom is the grand object of the
laws, and dispensed to the meanest individual, shall the
laws of an infant colony, Virginia, or of a barbarous
nation, Africa, prevail? From the submission of the
negro to the laws of England, he is liable to all their
penalties, and consequently has a right to their
protection
I now, in full conviction how opposite to natural
justice Mr. Stewart's claim is, in full persuasion of its
inconsistency with the laws of England, submit it
chearfully to the judgment of this honourable Court:
and hope as much honour to your Lordships from the
exclusion of this new slavery, as our ancestors
obtained by the abolition of the old.13
Similarly, Mr. Alleyne remarked:
But slavery is not a natural, 'tis a municipal relation;
an institution therefore confmed to certain places, and
necessarily dropt by passage into a country where such
municipal regulations do not subsist. The negro
making choice of his habituate here, has subjected
himself to the penalties, and is therefore entitled to the
protection of our laws.14
13. Id. at 499-502.
14. Id. at 502.
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Even John Dunning, arguing for Stewart, while insisting that
the English court ought, out of mutuality, respect the slavery laws of
Africa, explained that he "would not be understood to intimate a wish
in favour of slavery.' 5 Finally, Serjeant William Davy, again for
Somerset, pleaded with the Court not to "make a slave of the negro,
who is one, by his complexion" for it would be:
a cruelty and absurdity that I trust will never take place
here: such as if promulgated, would make England a
disgrace to all the nations under earth: for the reducing
a man, guiltless of any offence against the laws, to the
condition of slavery, the worst and most abject state. 16
Famously, Lord Mansfield ruled:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or
political; but only positive law, which preserves its
force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself
from whence it was created, is erased from memory:
it's so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support
it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences,
therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot say
this case is allowed or approved by the law of England;
and therefore the black must be discharged.' 7
It was largely a moral sentiment that led to slavery's
prohibition by the United Kingdom. As Niall Ferguson has written, it
was a "change of heart:" "It used to be argued that slavery was
abolished simply because it had ceased to be profitable, but all the
evidence points the other way: in fact, it was abolished despite the
fact it was still profitable."' 8  Religious agitation against slavery
ultimately led to political results. In 1792, the House of Commons
adopted a bill abolishing the slave trade, but it was rejected by the
House of Lords.' 9 Finally, the Lords relented and the slave trade was
abolished in 1807; slavery itself was made illegal throughout the
British Empire in 1833.20 British abolition of slavery was arguably
facilitated by the American Revolution. As one commentator has
15. Id. at 504.
16. Id. at 508-09.
17. Id. at 510.
18. NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE 119 (2003).
19. Id. at 121.
20. Id. at 121-22.
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remarked, without the economic incentives of protecting slave labor
in the American South, "[i]t was much easier for Britain to attack
slavery after the departure of the American colonies."21
What notice did late Eighteenth Century Americans take of
these foreign developments? One can hear echoes of Vattel's distaste
for slavery as a "disgrace to humanity" and Lord Mansfield's
characterization of slavery as "odious" in Thomas Jefferson's original
draft of the 1776 American Declaration of Independence. In a section
that, despite the author's protests, was ultimately excised from the
final document by the Revolutionary Congress, Jefferson complained
that:
[The King] has waged cruel war against human nature
itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty
in the persons of a distant people who never offended
him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in
another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in
their transportation hither. This piratical warfare, the
opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the
Christian king of Great Britain. Determined to keep
open a market where men should be bought and sold,
he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every
legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this
execrable commerce. And that this assemblage of
horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is
now exciting those very people to rise in arms among
us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has
deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he
also obtruded them: thus paying off former crimes
committed against the liberties of one people, with
crimes which he urges them to commit against the
lives of another.22
In the early Nineteenth Century, international opposition to
slavery hardened. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna, settling the
Napoleonic Wars among European powers, found the slave trade to
be abhorrent to basic principles of humanity and morality. Britain
pressed that, in order to abolish the slave trade, warships be entitled to
visit and search foreign merchant vessels. Bilateral treaties providing
for visit and search were concluded between Britain and Portugal,
21. Howard Temperley, The Ideology of Antislavery, in THE ABOLITION OF THE
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 21, 30 (David Eltis & James Walvin eds., 1981).
22. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 39 (Putnam
Capricorn ed., 1959).
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Spain, Holland, Sweden, and Brazil between 1815 and 1826. Wider
multilateral treaties for the suppression of the slave trade followed in
1831, 1833, and 1840; these included Britain, France, Denmark,
Sardinia, Naples, Tuscany, the Hansa towns, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia. Meanwhile, by statute Britain assimilated the crime of the
slave trade to that of piracy in 1824 and abolished slavery throughout
its colonies in 1840. France abolished slavery in its colonies in
1848.23 Tellingly, a principal book on the slave trade entitles its sixth
part, dealing with the period after 1807, as "The Illegal Era., 24 These
antislavery sentiments in international law and practice were reflected
by the first great American law treatise writer, James Kent.
Kent (1763-1847), Chancellor of the State of New York and
Professor of Law at Columbia University, published his four-volume
Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830).25 Alongside
Blackstone's Commentaries (1765-1769), Kent's Commentaries were
a staple in the educational diet of American lawyers well into the late
Nineteenth Century.26  Significantly, Kent's Commentaries gave
international law pride of place, the four-volume treatise beginning
with 200 pages devoted to the law of nations. 27  Kent condemned
earlier slavery practices:
The most refined states among the ancients seem to
have had no conception of the moral obligations of
justice and humanity between nations, and there was
no such thing in existence as the science of
international law. They regarded strangers and
enemies as virtually synonymous, and considered
foreign persons and property as lawful prize. Their
laws of war and peace were barbarous and deplorable
23. CONSTANTINE JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 395-97 (4th
ed. 1961).
24. HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE:
1440-1870, 561-785 (1997).
25. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1st ed. 1826).
26. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 290 (1974).
27. KENT., supra note 25, vol. 1, at 1-200. Kent's impact on international law was not
limited to the United States. John Thomas Abdy, an English barrister and Cambridge
Professor of Law, revised Kent's section on international law for a new edition of Kent on
international law in 1866, asserting that Kent was "the greatest jurist whom this age had
produced." KENT'S COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Abdy's 1st ed. 1866). A second
revised edition appeared twelve years later. KENT'S COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Abdy's 2d ed. 1878). A German international law scholar has recently concluded that Kent
was the "earliest writer to display the modem approach" to international law. Hans-Ulrich
Scupin, History of the Law of Nations 1815 to World War I, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 179, 196 (1984).
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S. .. It was the received opinion that Greeks were
bound to no duties, nor by any moral law, without
compact, and that prisoners taken in war had no rights,
and might lawfully be put to death, or sold into
perpetual slavery, with their wives and children.28
Kent criticized Roman jurisprudence:
[T]he barbarous doctrine [was] still asserted, that
prisoners of war became slaves jure gentium, and even
in respect to foreign nations with whom the Romans
were at peace, but had no particular alliance, it is laid
down in the Digest, that whoever passed from one
country to the other became immediately a slave.29
So, too, with the "northern tribes of Scythia and Germany:" "The
manners of nations were barbarous and their maxims of war cruel.
Slavery was considered as a lawful consequence of captivity."3
Kent's most detailed treatment of slavery is to be found in the
last section of his ninth and last lecture on the Law of Nations-"Of
Offences Against the Law of Nations"--where after considering
violations of international law involving safe conducts, ambassadors,
and pirates, he turned to the slave trade.3' He set the problem thus:
Personal slavery, arising out of forcible captivity, has
existed in every age of the world, and among the most
refined and civilized people. The possession of
persons so acquired has been invested with the
character of property. The slave trade was a regular
branch of commerce among the ancients; and a great
object of Athenian traffic with the Greek settlements
on the Euxine was procuring slaves from the
barbarians for the Greek market. In modern times,
treaties have been framed, and national monopolies
sought, to facilitate and extend commerce in this
species of property. It has been interwoven into the
municipal institutions of all the European colonies in
America, and with the approbation and sanction of the
parent states. It forms to this day the foundation of
large masses of property in the southern parts of the
28. KENT, supra note 25, at 4.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 179-87.
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United States. But, for half a century past, the African
slave trade began to awaken a spirit of remorse and
sympathy in the breasts of men, and a conviction that
the traffic was repugnant to the principles of Christian
duty, and the maxims of justice and humanity.32
Kent then turned to Montesquieu who "condemned all slavery
as useless and unjust."33 Kent praised the U.S. Constitution which
"laid the foundation... to put a final stop to the progress of this great
moral pestilence, by admitting a power in Congress to prohibit the
importation of slaves, after the expiration of the year 1807."" 4 He
detailed the acts of Congress restricting and then prohibiting the slave
trade. 35
Kent considered the question of whether the African slave
trade could be adjudged piracy or any other crime within the
contemplation of international law.36  Along with the American
statutes, he detailed the British and European statutes abolishing the
slave trade, as well as international agreements to that effect.37
Finally, he considered the contradictory holdings of the American and
British courts on the international legality of the slave trade.38 Kent
seems to have come to no final conclusion himself, but the following
is as close to a summing up as one finds. Note Kent's assumption
about the potent effect of international law on domestic courts:
[T]he slave trade is, abstractedly speaking, immoral
and unjust, and it is illegal, when declared so by treaty,
or municipal law; but... it is not piratical or illegal by
the common law of nations, because, if it were so,
every claim founded on the trade would at once be
rejected everywhere, and in every court, on that ground
alone.39
Kent, writing in the 1820s, wrote just as the movement to
32. Id. at 179-80.
33. Id. at 180.
34. Id (emphasis added). Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution provides, of
course, that: "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person."
35. KENT, supra note 25, at 180-81.
36. Id. at 182.
37. Id. at 182-83.
38. Id. at 184-87.
39. Idat 185.
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abolish the slave trade, as we have seen, was reaching fruition. The
effect of all this on the United States was soon at issue in the famous
contest between the two most distinguished judges then on the U.S.
Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story and Chief Justice John Marshall,
in La Jeune Eugenie4" and The Antelope.4
La Jeune Eugenie concerned a private French schooner seized
by a U.S. warship, the Alligator, off the coast of Africa on May 17,
1821. Though ostensibly engaged in the palm oil trade, La Jeune
Eugenie was fitted out to transport upwards of two hundred slaves,
and there was evidence that her captain had negotiated to buy slaves
at a place on the African coast called the "Factory." The question was
whether La Jeune Eugenie could be sold as a prize for violating the
act of Congress of March 2, 1807, which prohibited the slave trade to
the United States after June 1, 1808?
Story's judgment began with a strong condemnation of slavery
and the slave trade:
It is not, as the learned counsel for the government
have justly stated, on account of the simple fact, that
the traffic [in slaves] necessarily involves the
enslavement of human beings, that it stands
reprehended by the present sense of nations; but that it
necessarily carries with it a breach of all the moral
duties, of all the maxims of justice, mercy and
humanity, and of the admitted rights, which
independent Christian nations now hold sacred in their
intercourse with each other. What is the fact as to the
ordinary, nay, necessary course, of this trade? It
begins in corruption, and plunder, and kidnapping. It
creates and stimulates unholy wars for the purpose of
making captives. It desolates whole villages and
provinces for the purpose of seizing the young, the
feeble, the defenceless, and the innocent .... I speak
not from vague rumours, or idle tales, but from
authentic documents, and the known historical details
of the traffic-a traffic, that carries away at least
50,000 persons annually from their homes and their
families, and breaks the hearts, and buries the hopes,
and extinguishes the happiness of more than double
40. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 833-34 (C. C. Mass. 1822).
41. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
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that number.42
Story argued that the slave trade violated important first
principles of law:
But I think it may be unequivocally affirmed, that
every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct
reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and the
nature of moral obligation ... and unless it be relaxed
or waived by the consent of nations, which may be
evidenced by their general practice and customs, it
may be enforced by a court of justice, whenever it
arises in judgment ....
Now in respect to the African slave trade, such as it
has been described to be, and in fact is, in its origin,
progress, and consummation, it cannot admit of serious
question, that it is founded in violation of some of the
first principles, which ought to govern nations. It is
repugnant to the great principles of Christian duty, the
dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good
faith and morality, and the eternal maxims of social
justice.43
After reviewing the public policies of France and Great
Britain, Story held the slave trade to be illegal under international
law:
I think, therefore, that I am justified in saying, that at
the present moment the traffic is vindicated by no
nation, and is admitted by almost all commercial
nations as incurably unjust and inhuman. It appears to
me, therefore, that in an American court of judicature,
I am bound to consider the trade an offense against the
universal law of society and in all cases, where it is not
protected by a foreign government, to deal with it as an
offence carrying with it the penalty of confiscation. 44
Moreover, condemning La Jeune Eugenie only enforced a
mutual policy "repressing an odious traffic" and did not insult French
sovereignty: "It makes our own country, not a principal, but an
auxiliary, in enforcing the interdict of France and subserves the great
42. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. at 845-46.
43. Id. at 846.
44. Id. at 847.
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interests of universal justice."45
Sadly, the greatest of all early Nineteenth Century American
Supreme Court Justices, Chief Justice John Marshall, reached a
contrary position in The Antelope, a case decided in the Supreme
Court in 1825, just three years after Story's circuit court opinion in
the La Jeune Eugenie. The Antelope was a Spanish vessel which had
been seized and then manned by private U.S. citizens off the coast of
Africa and which was subsequently captured by U.S. warships off the
coast of the United States. At the time she was captured by the
United States, the Antelope held over 280 slaves that private U.S.
citizens had plundered from a number of Spanish and Portuguese
vessels engaged in the slave trade.46 The issue before the U.S.
Supreme Court was whether the slaves now legally belonged to the
Spanish and Portuguese slave traders who had bought the slaves in
Africa and whose ships had been seized by the private U.S. citizens or
whether the slaves were to be deemed prize and then freed pursuant to
U.S. law.47
Marshall ruled that though the slave trade might be immoral, it
had not been illegal because "for nearly two centuries, it was carried
on without opposition, and without censure."4  Though some
countries had made the slave trade illegal, they could not force this
illegality on others: "As no nation can prescribe a rule for others,
none can make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to
those whose governments have not forbidden it."49 The American
crew could not lawfully claim the Africans-they "cannot use the flag
of their own nation, [to] carry on this criminal and inhuman
traffic" 5 -- but the Africans who had been held by Portuguese and
Spanish citizens must be returned to them.51 Marshall found, in his
look at precedents, that the "principle common to these cases is, that
the legality of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade,
depends on the law of the country to which the vessel belongs."52 It is
in this context that Chief Justice Marshall stated what would become
The Antelope's most famous phrase: "The courts of no country
45. Id. at 850.
46. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 67-68.
47. Mark W. Janis, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Law: The Antelope's
Penal Law Exception, 20 INT'L LAW. 303 (1986).
48. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 121.
49. Id. at 122.
50. Id. at 130.
51. Id. at 130-32.
52. Id. at 118.
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execute the penal laws of another."53
Kent devoted 200 pages to international law and Story and
Marshall employed it in judgments, but it was Henry Wheaton (1785-
1848) who wrote the first English-language treatise about it.
Elements of International Law with a Sketch of the History of the
Subject was published in 1836.54
For his part, Wheaton was harshly critical of slavery. In the
very first paragraph of his 1836 original edition, Wheaton condemned
the Greeks and Romans for their "very imperfect notions of
international justice" and their "rude theory of public law" because in
them "the persons of aliens were doomed to slavery, and their
property to confiscation, the moment they passed the bounds of one
petty state and touched the confines of another."55 He lamented "the
universal practice of the ancient world" to "reduce to slavery
prisoners taken in war."56
Wheaton applauded the Spanish professors, Francis de
Victoria and Dominic Soto, who in the Sixteenth Century
"condemned, with honest boldness and independence, the cruel wars
of avarice carried on by their countrymen in the new world, under the
pretext of propagating what was called Christianity in that age."57 He
was, however, more sparing in his praise of Soto's position on slavery
and the slave trade:
It is said that Soto . . . condemned in the most
unmeasured terms the African slave-trade, then
beginning to be carried on by the Portuguese. But I do
not understand that Soto reprobated slavery in general,
or even the slave-trade itself, so long as it was
53. Id. at 123.
54. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A SKETCH OF THE
HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT (1st ed. 1836). Wheaton had been the Reporter for the U.S.
Supreme Court-his volumes, 14-25 of U.S. Reports, span 1816 to 1827-and later became
U.S. Minister to the Court of Berlin. Wheaton's International Law was a world-wide
phenomenon. In his lifetime, Wheaton prepared numerous editions in English and French,
published between 1836 and 1848; William Beach Lawrence produced American editions in
1855, 1857, and 1863; another American edition was prepared by Richard Henry Dana, Jr. in
1866; there were additional English editions in 1878, 1880, 1889, 1904, 1916, 1929, and
1944, French editions in 1848, 1858, 1874, 1878, an Italian edition in 1860, a Chinese edition
in 1864, and a Japanese edition in 1865. G.G. Wilson, Henry Wheaton and International
Law, in HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13a-17a (George Grafton
Wilson ed., 1936) [hereinafter DANA'S WHEATON]. Dana's volume used as its text
Wheaton's last versions of his book in English, 1846, and in French, 1848. Id. at 17a.
55. WHEATON, supra note 54, at 3.
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 23.
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confined to that unfortunate portion of the inhabitants
of Africa who had been doomed to servitude from time
immemorial, or had been enslaved by conquest in war,
in that age universally regarded as giving a legitimate
title to property in human beings jure gentium; but
only that he condemned that system of kidnapping, by
which the Portuguese traders seduced the natives to the
coast, under fraudulent pretences, and forced them by
violence on board their slave-ships.58
Writing after Story's judgment in La Jeune Eugenie and
Marshall's in The Antelope, Wheaton in his later editions referred to
both cases and first reflected Story:
The African slave-trade, once considered not only a
lawful but desirable branch of commerce, a
participation in which was made the object of wars,
negotiations, and treaties between different European
States, is now denounced as an odious crime, by the
almost universal consent of nations.
This general concert of nations to extinguish the traffic
has given rise to the opinion that though once
tolerated, and even protected and encouraged, by the
laws of every maritime country, it ought henceforth to
be considered as interdicted by the international code
of Europe and America.59
Wheaton then reflected upon Marshall: "A right, then, which
was vested in all by the consent of all, could be devested only by
consent; and this trade, in which all had participated, must remain
lawful to those who could not be induced to relinquish it."6
As juridical and judicial opinion became increasingly hostile
towards slavery, so did popular sentiment. This is no place to attempt
even to summarize the general antagonism towards slavery and the
international criticism of the gap between the U.S. rhetoric of liberty
and our practice. Witness just one example from the London Law
Times. In 1844, the paper protested "the monstrous sentence of death
recently passed by an American tribunal upon a young man of
unexceptional character, for the crime of aiding the escape of a female
58. Id. at 23-24.
59. DANA'S WHEATON, supra note 54, at 168, 170-71.
60. Id. at 179.
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slave."61 A Louisiana court was roundly condemned:
At first the story was received here with incredulity; it
was doubted if a law so diabolical did exist among any
people pretending to Christianity and civilization. But
subsequent arrivals have not only confirmed the
disgraceful tale, but brought the very words of the
address of the learned judge, O'Neall, to the prisoner,
on passing his atrocious sentence. The perversion of
religion, the blasphemous use made of the Scriptures
to justify a judicial murder, which pervade this
effusion, have stricken the public mind of Europe with
horror, and added immensely to the ill-repute which
America has of late so liberally earned for herself by
repudiation, and other disreputable practices.62
The Law Times faulted not only the judge and the state of Louisiana,
but all Americans "who cannot reconcile their braggart boastings of
liberty with their cruel deeds of tyranny. 63
This kind of outright hostility to slavery elicited pro-slavery
arguments that became increasingly ludicrous. Look, for example, at
the writings of George Fitzhugh, a Virginian and a leading defender
of the virtues of slavery. In his book, Sociology for the South,
published in 1854, Fitzhugh argued that Southern slaves were better
off than Northern wage-earners: "We provide for each slave, in old
age and in infancy, in sickness and in health, not according to his
labor, but according to his wants."'  Southern slave owners were
superior as individuals to Northerners:
[T]hough men are often found at variance with wife or
children, we never saw one who did not like his slaves,
and rarely a slave who was not devoted to his master
.... We go farther, and say the slave-holder is better
than others-because he has greater occasion for the
exercise of the affections .... We are better husbands,
better fathers, and better neighbors than our Northern
brethren.65
61. Law in America, 2 LAw TIMES 527 (1844).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society, in THE
UNION IN CRISIS: 1850-1877, 91, 104 (Robert W. Johannson ed., 1965).
65. Id. at 105-06.
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All in all, for Fitzhugh, Southern slave society was much
preferable to Northern free society:
At the slaveholding South all is peace, quiet, plenty
and contentment. We have no mobs, no trade unions,
no strikes for higher wages, no armed resistance to the
law, but little jealousy of the rich by the poor. We
have but few in our jails, and fewer in our poor houses.
We produce enough of the comforts and necessaries of
life for a population three or four times as numerous as
ours. We are wholly exempt from the torrent of
pauperism, crime, agrarianism, and infidelity which
Europe is pouring from her jails and alms houses on
the already crowded North.66
The virulence of Fitzhugh's racist rhetoric was more than
counter-balanced by the eloquence of the remarkable escaped slave,
Frederick Douglass, whose writings, along with those of Harriet
Beecher Stowe, dramatically painted a much different picture of the
realities of Southern slave-holding culture:
There were no beds given the slaves, unless one coarse
blanket be considered such, and none but the men and
women had these. This, however, is not considered a
very great privation. They find less difficulty from the
want of beds, than from the want of time to sleep; for
when their day's work in the field is done, the most of
them having their washing, mending, and cooking to
do, and having few or none of the ordinary facilities
for doing either of these, very many of their sleeping
hours are consumed in preparing for the field the
coming day; and when this is done, old and young,
male and female, married and single, drop down side
by side, on one common bed-the cold, damp floor-
each covering himself or herself with their miserable
blankets; and here they sleep till they are summoned to
the field by the driver's horn. At the sound of this, all
must rise, and be off to the field. There must be no
halting; every one must be at his or her post; and woe
betides them who hear not this morning summons to
the field; for if they are not awakened by the sense of
hearing, they are by the sense of feeling: no age nor
sex finds any favor. Mr. Severe, the overseer, used to
66. Id. at 110.
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stand by the door of the quarter, armed with a large
hickory stick and heavy cowskin, ready to whip any
one who was so unfortunate as not to hear, or, from
any other cause, was prevented from being ready to
start for the field at the sound of the horn.
Mr. Severe was rightly named: he was a cruel man. I
have seen him whip a woman, causing the blood to run
half an hour at the time, and this, too, in the midst of
her crying children, pleading for their mother's release.
He seemed to take pleasure in manifesting his fiendish
barbarity. Added to his cruelty, he was a profane
swearer. It was enough to chill the blood and stiffen
the hair of an ordinary man to hear him talk. Scarce a
sentence escaped him but that was commenced or
concluded by some horrid oath. The field was the
place to witness his cruelty and profanity. His
presence made it both the field of blood and
blasphemy. From the rising till the going down of the
sun, he was cursing, raving, cutting, and slashing
among the slaves of the field, in the most frightful
manner.
67
By 1860, Douglass, not Fitzhugh, was winning the battle for
public opinion. As an English review of three American books about
slavery wrote, a "difficulty" of international law is that it "is subject
to change, not simultaneous among all the nations recognizing
[slavery]."68 In any case, American acceptance of slavery was falling
out of international favor:
In the mean time, general society and public opinion
throughout the world is becoming more and more
pronounced. Russia even-the mighty representative
of absolute imperial government-is making huge
efforts and sacrifices to throw off the degrading
incubus. Any sincere or candid attempt made in
America to escape from or mitigate the cruel evil they
have inherited, should receive warm sympathy from
Englishmen.69
67. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN
AMERICAN SLAVE 33-34 (Benjamin Quarles ed., 1960) (1845).
68. The Law of Slavery, L. MAG. & L. REV., Nov. 1859-Feb. 1860, at 31, 53.
69. Id. at 53-54.
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II. DRED SCOTT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The legal equivalent to Fitzhugh's outlandish and
inflammatory defense of slavery was, of course, the U.S. Supreme
Court's judgment in Dred Scott v. Sandford.7" Not only was Dred
Scott the crucial U.S. judicial decision about slavery, but the Supreme
Court decision was itself a cause of the Civil War. Dred Scott
inflamed passions in both the North and the South, and thus
contributed mightily to the sectional animosities that led to the armed
conflict.
Dred Scott is one of the most important decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, as well as the most criticized. In an introductory
paragraph to his illuminating article about modem views on Dred
Scott, Professor Mark A. Graber summarized the universal
condemnation of the Supreme Court's handling of the case:
"American legal and constitutional scholars," The
Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court states,
"consider the Dred Scott decision to be the worst ever
rendered by the Supreme Court." David Currie's
encyclopedic The Constitution in the Supreme Court
maintains that the decision was "bad policy," "bad
judicial politics" and "bad law." Commentators across
the political spectrum describe Dred Scott as "the
worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth
century," "the worst atrocity in the Supreme Court's
history, .... the most disastrous opinion the Supreme
Court has ever issued," "the most odious action ever
taken by a branch of the federal government," a
"ghastly error," a "tragic failure to follow the terms of
the Constitution," "a gross abuse of trust," "a lie before
God," and "judicial review at its worst." In the words
of former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the
Dred Scott decision was a "self inflicted [wound] that
almost destroyed the Supreme Court."71
While not rebutting any of this well-deserved criticism,72 let us
70. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
71. Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 271-72 (1997) (citations omitted).
72. Sometimes the modem response to Dred Scott is virtual, probably embarrassed,
silence. For example, in the more than one thousand pages of text in Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky's constitutional law hornbook, Dred Scott appears just twice and each time as a
single sentence: first as an example of a case overturned by a constitutional amendment, and
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focus here on a little-appreciated aspect of Dred Scott. The judgment
is an excellent example of how international law discourse had
become a legal commonplace in the United States by the middle years
of the Nineteenth Century. All but the two briefest opinions of the
nine Supreme Court judges relied at least in part on international law
arguments, addressing a variety of legal issues in conflicting ways.
Whatever the fairness of the New York Tribune's contemporaneous
repudiation of Dred Scott as having "just so much moral weight as ...
the judgment of those congregated in any Washington bar-room,"73
the opinions were carefully wrought legal arguments. The judgment
is long, about 240 pages of closely reasoned opinions from nine
Justices. Eerily, some of Dred Scott still echoes in American
international law arguments today, almost 150 years later.
The facts of the case are set out by the reporter and in several
opinions. Dred Scott was held as a slave in Missouri by Dr. John
Emerson, an Army doctor. In 1834, Scott moved with his master to
Rock Island in the free state of Illinois and then in 1836 to Fort
Snelling in U.S. territory in part of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from
France, in what later became Minnesota. Here, slavery had been
abolished by the 1820 Missouri Compromise. Also, in 1836 Scott
married Harriet, a slave brought to Fort Snelling by Major Taliaferro,
who had sold her to Dr. Emerson. Returning with Harriet and Dr.
Emerson to Missouri in 1838, Scott sued in Missouri state court in
1846 for his freedom and that of his family (Harriet and their two
children, Eliza and Lizzie), succeeding at the trial court in 1850, but
losing an appeal before the Missouri Supreme Court in 1854.
In 1853 Dr. Emerson's widow, as part of the settlement of her
husband's estate, sold Dred Scott and his family to her brother, John
A. Sanford (misspelled as Sandford by the court), a citizen of New
York. Scott then brought suit in 1854 in the U.S. Circuit Court in
Missouri "to assert the title of himself and his family to freedom."
Sanford asserted that the courts had no jurisdiction in the diversity of
the case, because although he, Sanford, was a citizen of New York,
Scott was not, as alleged, a citizen of Missouri, since he was "a negro
of African descent: his ancestors were of pure African blood, and
who were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves."74
second in his discussion of "The Impact of Marbury v. Madison," when he notes that Dred
Scott-this "infamous case"-was the first post-Marbury declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a federal statute. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 12, 43-44 (1997).
73. DON FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1981).
74. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 396-400.
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Turning to the nine judges in Dred Scott, one begins, of
course, with the Opinion of the Court, famously rendered by the Chief
Justice, Roger Taney (1777-1864)." 5 Taney, a Maryland native and
the Court's first Catholic member, was a staunch Jacksonian
Democrat who had served as Andrew Jackson's Attorney General and
later as interim Secretary of the Treasury.7 6 Taney's opinion was
probably the most inflammatory of all nine, not only because it was
styled "the opinion" of the Court, but because it seemed to go out of
its way to scold the North. It thereby undermined the position of
moderate northern Democrats like Senator Stephen Douglas and
empowered more radical Republicans like future President Abraham
Lincoln.7
Taney began by identifying what in his opinion were the
case's "two leading questions:"
1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between
these parties?
2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given
erroneous or not?
78
International law arguments appeared twice in Taney's
opinion, first with respect to the nature of a state and whether or not
African Americans could ever be U.S. citizens with access to federal
courts, and second with respect to the relationships, if any, that
international law should have on the law of the United States,
specifically the constitutionality of the 1820 Missouri Compromise
that, inter alia, forbade slavery in much of the Louisiana Territory
bought from Napoleon in 1803. Taney's opinion was inflammatory
in both respects. His analysis of the jurisdictional issue was
shockingly bold:
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose
ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as
slaves, become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution
75. Id. at 399-454.
76. Paul Finkelman, Taney, Roger Brooke, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN
LAW 783, 783-84 (2002).
77. As to the relative importance of Taney's opinion, The American Law Register in its
report of the case summarized the facts and proceedings and devoted ten pages to Taney, but
only half a page in total to the opinions of the other judges. 7 THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
321, 323-34 (1859).
78. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400.
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of the United States, and as such become entitled to all
the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed
by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights
is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States
in the cases specified in the Constitution.79
Taney quickly moved into an international legal analysis of
states and nations as he distinguished the "situation of this [Black]
population" from "that of the Indian race."8
[A]lthough [the Indians] were uncivilized, they were
yet a free and independent people, associated together
in nations or tribes, and governed by their own
laws .... These Indian Governments were regarded
and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if
an ocean had separated the red man from the
white .... [The Indians] may, without doubt, like the
subjects of any other foreign Government, be
naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become
citizens of a State, and of the United States; and if an
individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up
his abode among the white population, he would be
entitled to all the rights and privileges which would
belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.8"
In addition to distinguishing African Americans from Indians
and asserting a historical account that was directly and persuasively
refuted by dissenting Justices McLean and Curtis, Chief Justice Taney
argued that Blacks never were and never could be U.S. citizens. He
felt that when the U.S. Constitution was drafted:
[T]he legislation and histories of the times, and the
language used in the Declaration of Independence,
show, that neither the class of persons who had been
imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they
had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a
part of the people, nor intended to be included in the
general words used in that memorable instrument.
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public
opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which
prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of
79. Id. at 403.
80. Id.
81. Id. at403-04.
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the world at the time of the Declaration of
Independence, and when the Constitution of the United
States was framed and adopted. But the public history
of every European nation displays it in a manner too
plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit ....
And in no nation was this opinion more firmly fixed or
more uniformly acted upon than by the English
Government and English people. They not only seized
them on the coast of Africa, and sold them or held
them in slavery for their own use; but they took them
as ordinary articles of merchandise to every country
where they could make a profit on them, and were far
more extensively engaged in this commerce than any
other nation in the world.82
Arguing that this opinion was generally shared throughout the
thirteen American states at the end of the Eighteenth Century,83 Taney
concluded this first part of his decision:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in
public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate
race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this
country, should induce the court to give to the words
of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their
favor than they were intended to bear when the
instrument was framed and adopted .... Dred Scott
was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as
such to sue in its courts; and, consequently.., the
Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and...
the judgment on the plea in abatement is erroneous.14
82. Id. at 407-08.
83. Id. at 408-26.
84. Id. at 426-27.
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The second part of Chief Justice Taney's opinion was just as
unnecessarily inflammatory as the first: it held the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional, the first and only such finding of the
unconstitutionality of an act of Congress since Chief Justice
Marshall's famous holding in Marbury v. Madison, fifty-four years
before.8 5 Here is how Chief Justice Taney set forth the issue:
The act of Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies,
declares that slavery and involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, shall be forever prohibited
in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under
the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six
degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and not included
within the limits of Missouri. And the difficulty which
meets us at the threshold of this point of inquiry is,
whether Congress was authorized to pass this law
under any of the powers granted to it by the
Constitution; for if the authority is not given by that
instrument, it is the duty of this court to declare it void
and inoperative, and incapable of conferring freedom
upon any one who is held as a slave under the laws of
any one of the States.86
After examining the history of the acquisition and the
government of the territory by Congress,87 Taney turned to Article IV,
Section 2(2) of the Constitution, giving Congress the power "to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States."88 Taney
argued that, nevertheless, Congress had no right "to prohibit a citizen
of the United States from taking any property which he lawfully held
into a Territory of the United States,"89 and that, moreover, "the
power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never
be a mere discretionary power under our Constitution and form of
Government... [but is] regulated and plainly defined by the
Constitution itself."9 Looking at the prohibition of the Constitution,
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the
United States of his liberty or property, merely because
85. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
86. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432.
87. Id. at 432-36.
88. Id. at 436.
89. Id. at 446.
90. Id. at 449.
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he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States, and who had
committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be
dignified with the [Fifth Amendment's] due process of
law.9
At this point, Taney referred to but denied the potency of the
law of nations:
It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a
difference between property in a slave and other
property, and that different rules may be applied to it
in expounding the Constitution of the United States.
And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of
eminent jurists upon the relation of master and slave
and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers
which Governments may exercise over it, have been
dwelt upon in the argument.
But in considering the question before us, it must be
borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing
between the people of the United States and their
Government, and interfering with their relation to each
other .... And no laws or usages of other nations, or
reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of
master and slave, can enlarge the powers of the
Government, or take from the citizens the rights they
have reserved. And if the Constitution recognises the
right of property of the master in a slave and makes no
distinction between that description of property and
other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting
under the authority of the United States, whether it be
legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw
such a distinction or deny to him the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided
for the protection of private property against the
encroachments of the Government.92
Hence, Taney moved to his second controversial holding:
[I]t is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning
property of this kind in the territory of the United
91. Id. at 450.
92. Id. at 451.
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States north of the line therein mentioned, is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void;
and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his
family, were made free by being carried into this
territory; even if they had been carried there by the
owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent
resident. 93
The lengthy opinion of the Chief Justice, fifty-five pages long,
is followed by one of the two brief opinions in Dred Scott, that of Mr.
Justice James Wayne (1790-1867), a Princeton graduate and loyal
Jacksonian Democrat from Georgia.94 It is a little over two pages
long, has no reference to international law, and states that Taney's
"opinion of the court has my unqualified assent."95
The third opinion, by Mr. Justice Samuel Nelson (1792-
1873), though only twelve pages long, is significant because it
represents a different juristic way to approach the facts of the case and
yet still find for Sanford.9 6 Nelson, a New York Democrat, had tried
but failed to act as a-moderating force between, on the one hand, the
five southern Democratic justices led by Taney, and, on the other, the
two northern dissenters, John McLean, a Republican, and Benjamin
Curtis, a Whig.97 Nelson's opinion carefully avoided venturing a
view on the possibility of African Americans ever being U.S. citizens
or evaluating the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, the
two decisive but explosive issues for Taney. Rather, Nelson relied
heavily on private international law, what we sometimes in the United
States call conflict of laws, simply to decide that Missouri had the
right to apply its own law of slavery to the case. Nelson set out his
version of the case thus:
The question upon the merits, in general terms, is,
whether or not the removal of the plaintiff, who was a
slave, with his master, from the State of Missouri to
the State of Illinois, with a view to a temporary
residence, and after such a residence and return to the
slave State, such residence in the free State works an
emancipation. 9
8
93. Id. at 452.
94. Id. at 454-56 ('Wayne, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 456.
96. Id. at 457-69 (Nelson, J., concurring).
97. STANLEY KUTLER, THE DRED ScoTr DECISION: LAW OR POLITICS? xi (1967).
98. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 458-59 (Nelson, J., concurring).
2005]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Nelson treated the question as one of private international law:
Our opinion is, that the question is one which belongs
to each State to decide for itself, either by its
Legislature or courts of justice; and hence, in respect to
the case before us, to the State of Missouri [which had
decided in its Supreme Court that Scott remained a
slave]-a question exclusively of Missouri law, and
which, when determined by that State, it is the duty of
the Federal Courts to follow it. In other words, except
in cases where the power is restrained by the
Constitution of the United States, the law of the state is
supreme over the subject of slavery within its
jurisdiction.99
Nelson enunciated a classical territorial theory of private
international law, characteristic of U.S. judges throughout the
Nineteenth Century:
Every State or nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within her own territory;
and, her laws affect and bind all property and persons
residing within it. It may regulate the manner and
circumstances under which property is held, and the
condition, capacity, and state, of all persons therein;
and, also, the remedy and modes of administering
justice. And it is equally true, that no State or nation
can affect or bind property out of its territory, or
persons not residing within it. No State, therefore, can
enact laws to operate beyond its own dominions, and,
if it attempts to do so, it may be lawfully refused
obedience. Such laws can have no inherent authority
extra-territorially. This is the necessary result of the
independence of distinct and separate sovereignties.' °
Nelson relied heavily on authorities from private international
law. Story was cited, for example, for the proposition "that a State
may prohibit the operation of all foreign laws, and the rights growing
out of them, within its territories."'' 1 Ulrich Huberus (1635-1694),
the Dutch scholar famous for his contributions to the modern theory
of comity,"°2 was refuted insofar as he argued that "personal
99. Id. at 459.
100. Id. at 460.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 461; Kurt. H. Nadelmann, Introduction to Hessell E. Yntema, The Comity
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qualities ... accompany the person wherever he goes,"1°3 among
other things, because "this general rule of Huberus, referred to, has
not been admitted in the practice of nations, nor is it sanctioned by the
most approved jurists of international law," citing to Story, Kent, and
William Burge (1787-1849), a then popular English jurist on private
international law.'04
And, as the reach of the law of Illinois is limited, so is the law
of the United States: "Congress possesses no power to regulate or
abolish slavery within the States ... "105 Nelson saw no reasonable
argument to the contrary:
The argument, we think, in any aspect in which it may
be viewed, is utterly destitute of support upon any
principles of constitutional law, as, according to that,
Congress has no power whatever over the subject of
slavery within the State; and is also subversive of the
established doctrine of international jurisprudence, as,
according to that, it is an axiom that the laws of one
Government have no force within the limits of another,
or extra-territorially, except from the consent of the
latter. 106
Then follows the fourth opinion in the majority, the brief one
of Mr. Justice Robert Grier (1794-1870).07 Grier, a Pennsylvanian
and graduate of Dickinson College, was, like Nelson, a northern
Democrat, and, "subject to the usual cross-pressures of party and
section," tended to be "if not pro-slavery, at least anti-antislavery." '' °8
In only two paragraphs, Grier stated that he concurred in the
jurisdictional analysis of Mr. Justice Nelson and, perhaps a little
oddly and unnecessarily, with the Chief Justice on the
unconstitutionality of the Missouri Compromise and the inability of
Dred Scott to sue as a citizen of Missouri. 10 9
Of all the seven opinions in the majority, it is the fifth opinion,
that of Mr. Justice Peter Daniel (1784-1860), that is the most
vehement in its unabashed defense of slavery. Justice Daniel, a
Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1966).
103. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 461 (Nelson, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 462.
105. Id. at 464.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring).
108. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 73, at 119.
109. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 469 (Grier, J., concurring).
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Virginia Democrat who had attended Princeton, stated plainly:
Now, the following are truths which a knowledge of
the history of the world, and particularly of that of our
own country, compels us to know-that the African
negro race never have been acknowledged as
belonging to the family of nations; that as amongst
them there never has been known or recognized by the
inhabitants of other countries anything partaking of the
character of nationality, or civil or political polity; that
this race has been by all the nations of Europe regarded
as subjects of capture or purchase; as subjects of
commerce or traffic; and that the introduction of that
race into every section of this country was not as
members of civil or political society, but as slaves, as
property in the strictest sense of the term .... [Hence,
it] may be assumed as a postulate, that to a slave, as
such, there appertains and can appertain no relation,
civil or political, with the State or the Government. He
is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency
to the interests, the convenience, or the will of his
owner. 1 
0
In his argument, Daniel relied heavily on sources drawn from
public international law. He set out Vattel's exposition on the nature
of a State:
Thus Vattel, in the preliminary chapter to his Treatise
on the Law of Nations, says: "Nations or States are
bodies politic; societies of men united together for the
purpose of promoting their mutual safety and
advantage, by the joint efforts of their mutual strength
.... The authority of all over each member essentially
belongs to the body politic or the State . . . .The
citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to
this society by certain duties, and subject to its
authority; they equally participate in its advantages.
The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in
the country, of parents who are citizens. As society
cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children
of the citizens, those children naturally follow the
condition of their parents and succeed to all their rights
110. Id. at 475-76 (Daniel, J., concurring).
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.. " (Vattel, Book 1, chap. 19, p. 101)."1
From this part of Vattel, Daniel somehow concluded:
From the views here expressed, and they seem to be
unexceptionable, it must follow, that with the slave,
with one devoid of rights or capacities, civil or
political, there could be no pact; that one thus situated
could be no party to, or actor in, the association of
those possessing free will, power, discretion. He could
form no part of the design, no constituent ingredient or
portion of a society based upon common, that is, upon
equal interests and powers. He could not at the same
time be the sovereign and the slave." 2
Daniel turned to foreign public law, the law of ancient Rome,
to show that when slaves began to be made Roman citizens, it led to
the decline of the Empire:" 3
The proud title of Roman citizen, with the immunities
and rights incident thereto, and as contradistinguished
alike from the condition of conquered subjects or of
the lower grades of native domestic residents, was
maintained throughout the duration of the republic, and
until a late period of the eastern empire, and at last was
in effect destroyed less by an elevation of the inferior
classes than by the degradation of the free, and the
previous possessors of rights and immunities civil and
political, to the indiscriminate abasement incident to
absolute and simple despotism.' 4
All this confirmed the belief of Justice Daniel that African
Americans had never been and could and should never be U.S.
citizens:
That in the establishment of the several communities
now the States of this Union, and in the formation of
the Federal Government, the African was not deemed
politically a person. He was regarded and owned in
every State in the Union as property merely, and as
such was not and could not be a party or an actor,
111. Id. at 476-77.
112. Id. at 477.
113. Id. at 478.
114. Id. at 478.
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much less a peer in any compact or form of
government established by the States or the United
States.115
Later in his opinion, Daniel again employed Vattel, this time
to argue in favor of the sovereign rights of the states of the United
States:
Vattel, in his chapter on the general principles of the
laws of nations, section 15th, tells us, that "nations
being free and independent of each other in the same
manner that men are naturally free and independent,
the second general law of their society is, that each
nation should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of
that liberty which she inherits from nature . . . . A
small republic is no less a sovereign state that the most
powerful kingdom."116
Daniel also looked to Chancellor Kent for support, mistaking
Kent's argument for the sovereign rights of the United States as an
argument for the sovereign rights of the several states of the Union:
Chancellor Kent, in the 1st volume of his
Commentaries, lecture 2d, after collating the opinions
of Grotius, Heineccius, Vattel, and Rutherford,
enunciates the following positions as sanctioned by
these and other learned publicists, viz: that "nations
are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim
equal consideration for their rights, whatever may be
their relative dimensions or strength, or however
greatly they may differ in government, religion, or
manners. This perfect equality and entire
independence of all distinct States is a fundamental
principle of public law. It is a necessary consequence
of this equality, that each nation has a right to govern
itself as it may think proper, and no one nation is
entitled to dictate a form of government or religion, or
a course of internal policy, to another." '117
Justice Daniel then asserted that international law never
provided an exception to limit state sovereignty:
115. Id.at481.
116. Id. at 483-84.
117. Id. at 484-85.
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With reference to this right of self-government in
independent sovereign States, an opinion has been
expressed, which, whilst it concedes this right as
inseparable from and as a necessary attribute of
sovereignty and independence, asserts nevertheless
some implied and paramount authority of a supposed
international law, to which this right of self-
government must be regarded and exerted as
subordinate; and from which independent and
sovereign States can be exempted only by a protest, or
by some public and formal rejection of that authority.
With all respect for those by whom this opinion has
been professed, I am constrained to regard it as utterly
untenable, as palpably inconsistent, and as presenting
in argument a complete felo de se.'"8
Similarly in concluding that the Missouri Compromise was
invalid, 9 Daniel felt, among other things, that it was simply
impossible for an act of Congress to "destroy or in any degree to
control rights, either of person or property, entirely within the bounds
of a distinct and independent sovereignty-rights invested and
fortified by the guaranty of that sovereignty."' 2 °
The sixth opinion in the majority is that of Mr. Justice John
Campbell (1811-1889). lz' Campbell, a successful Alabama lawyer
who later became Assistant Secretary of War in the Confederate
government, approached the case, like Nelson, more moderately, not
as a matter involving the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but as one
applying private international law.'22 Unlike Nelson, who used
private international law simply to show that Scott, if in Missouri,
was subject to Missouri's law of slavery, Campbell employed
international law to try to demonstrate more boldly that Scott
remained a slave even when he moved with his master to free
territory:
It will be conceded, that in countries where no law or
regulation prevails, opposed to the existence and
consequences of slavery, persons who are born in that
condition in a foreign State would not be liberated by
118. Id. at 485.
119. Id. at487-92.
120. Id. at 488.
121. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 493-518 (Campbell, J., concurring).
122. Id.
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the accident of their introgression. The relation of
domestic slavery is recognised in the law of nations,
and the interference of the authorities of one State with
the rights of a master belonging to another, without a
valid cause, is a violation of that law.123
Campbell relied on precedents drawn from the public law of
Europe, U.S. diplomatic exchanges, the works of Jean Bodin (1530-
1596)-the French philosopher instrumental in the development of
the modem doctrine of state sovereignty-and, remarkably and,
implausibly, on Somerset.24 Moreover, Campbell held it was the
"settled doctrine of this court, that the Federal Government can
exercise no power over the subject of slavery within the States, nor
control the intermigration of slaves, other than fugitives, among the
States."' 25 Campbell, reviewing the history of the U.S. territories,
concluded that the Constitution gave "no power upon Congress to
dissolve the relations of the master and slave on the domain of the
United States, either within or without any of the States."' 26
The seventh and final opinion in the majority is that of Mr.
Justice John Catron (1786-1865), a self-educated Tennessee
Democrat, who later opposed secession and remained on the U.S.
Supreme Court throughout the Civil War. 2 7 Though brief, Catron's
opinion made an important argument based on international law.
After a review of the history of the power of Congress to govern the
territories of the original Union,'28 Catron turned to "the power of
Congress ... west of the Mississippi."'29 There he relied on the third
article of the 1803 treaty by which France sold the Louisiana
Territory to the United States, giving "the inhabitants of the ceded
territory . . . the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and
immunities, of citizens of the United States; and, in the mean time,
they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.' 13°  Since
"Louisiana was a province where slavery was not only lawful, but
where property in slaves was the most valuable of all personal
123. Id. at 495 (citing WHEATON, LAW OF NATIONS at 724; 5 Stats. at Large, 601; Calh.
Sp., 378; Reports of the Corn. U.S. and G.B., 187, 238, 241)
124. Id. at 495-500.
125. Id. at 500.
126. Id. at 517.
127. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (29 How.) at 518-29 (1857) (Catron, J., concurring).
128. Id. at518-24.
129. Id. at 524.
130. Id.
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property, '131 Catron felt that "the third article of the treaty of 1803,
ceding Louisiana to the United States, stands protected by the
Constitution, and cannot be repealed by Congress," and hence, "that
the act of 1820, known as the Missouri compromise, violates the most
leading feature of the Constitution-a feature on which the Union
depends, and which secures to the respective States and their citizens
an entire equality of rights, privileges, and immunities.'
132
Turning now to the first of the two dissents, Mr. Justice John
McLean (1785-1861), an Ohio Democrat turned Free Soiler with
Republican presidential ambitions, leaned heavily on international
law.133 McLean easily dismissed the notion that African Americans
could not be citizens for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts:
In the argument, it was said that a colored citizen
would not be an agreeable member of society. This is
more a matter of taste than of law. Several of the
States have admitted persons of color to the right of
suffrage, and in this view have recognised them as
citizens; and this has been done in the slave as well as
the free States. On the question of citizenship, it must
be admitted that we have not been very fastidious.
Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made
citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors. The
same was done in the admission of Louisiana and
Florida. No one ever doubted, and no court ever held,
that the people of these Territories did not become
citizens under the treaty. They have exercised all the
rights of citizens, without being naturalized under the
acts of Congress. 134
Turning to the international legality of slavery, McLean began
by showing how little modern international law supported the
institution:
131. Id.
132. Id. at 528-29. Catron's consideration of the 1803 Louisiana Territory treaty
prompted Mr. Justice Curtis's famous "last in time" rejoinder, which we look at below,
proposing the equal status of treaties and statutes under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.
Another notable aspect of the Catron opinion is that it seems to qualify the modem
observation that "[b]efore the mid-twentieth century, there was little focus [in American law]
on the status of individual constitutional rights as against the treaty power." Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, International Law, and Constituional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1999, 2002 (2003).
133. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 529-64 (McLean, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 533.
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The civil law throughout the Continent of Europe, it is
believed, without an exception, is, that slavery can
exist only within the territory where it is established;
and that, if a slave escapes, or is carried beyond such
territory, his master cannot reclaim him, unless by
virtue of some express stipulation. (Grotius, lib. 2,
chap. 15, 5, 1; lib. 10, chap. 10, 2, 1; Wicqueposts
Ambassador, lib. 1, p. 418; 4 Martin, 385; Case of the
Creole in the House of Lords, 1842; 1 Phillimore on
International Law, 316, 335.)
There is no nation in Europe which considers itself
bound to return to his master a fugitive slave, under the
civil law or the law of nations. On the contrary, the
slave is held to be free where there is no treaty
obligation, or compact in some other form, to return
him to his master.135
The international limitations on slavery were confirmed, in
McLean's opinion, by the decisions of the U.S. and English courts,
"fully recognised in Somersett's case, which was decided before the
American Revolution," '36 and hence part of American common law.
McLean relied upon the judgment of Lord Mansfield in Somerset,
quoting the following passage verbatim:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or
political, but only by positive law, which preserves its
force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself,
from whence it was created, are erased from the
memory. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered
to support it but positive law. 37
McLean had quite a different view of America's constitutional
history than that of the majority justices, seeing it in a historical and
international context:
[W]e know as a historical fact, that James Madison,
that great and good man, a leading member in the
Federal Convention, was solicitous to guard the
language of that instrument so as not to convey the
idea that there could be property in man.
135. Id. at 534.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 535.
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I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a
means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings,
rather than to look behind that period, into a traffic
which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with
death by Christian nations. I do not like to draw the
sources of our domestic relations from so dark a
ground. 38
Besides constitutional history, McLean relied on religious
authority: "A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his
Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is
destined to an endless existence.'
'1 39
McLean argued that Dred Scott's residence in Illinois and the
Louisiana Territory had legally freed him and his family:
When Dred Scott, his wife and children, were removed
from Fort Snelling to Missouri, in 1838, they were
free ... the residence of a master with his slave in the
State of Illinois, or in the Territory north of Missouri,
where slavery was prohibited by the act called the
Missouri compromise, would manumit the slave as
effectually as if he had executed a deed of
emancipation. 14
0
McLean then followed Blackstone's traditional rule and saw
the law of nations as part of the law of Missouri:
In 1816, the common law, by statute, was made a part
of the law of Missouri; and that includes the great
principles of international law. These principles
cannot be abrogated by judicial decisions. It will
require the same exercise of power to abolish the
common law, as to introduce it. International law is
founded in the opinions generally received and acted
on by civilized nations, and enforced by moral
sanctions. It becomes a more authoritative system
when it results from special compacts, founded on
modified rules, adapted to the exigencies of human
society; it is in fact an international morality, adapted
to the best interests of nations. And in regard to the
States of this Union, on the subject of slavery, it is
138. Id. at 537.
139. Id. at 550.
140. Id. at 554-55.
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eminently fitted for a rule of action, subject to the
Federal Constitution. "The laws of nations are but the
natural rights of man applied to nations." (Vattel.) T'
Given the incorporation of the law of nations in the common
law of Missouri, and given the international legal right of a slave to
go free in free territory, McLean's concluded:
If the common law have the force of a statutory
enactment in Missouri, it is clear, as it seems to me,
that a slave who, by a residence in Illinois in the
service of his master, becomes entitled to his freedom,
cannot again be reduced to slavery by returning him to
his former domicile in a slave State. 142
Then followed a rebuttal of Catron's argument about the effect
of the 1803 French treaty selling the Louisiana Territory to the United
States, an issue more thoroughly and famously refuted by Mr. Justice
Curtis below. For his part, Mr. Justice McLean wrote:
It is supposed by some, that the third article in the
treaty of cession of Louisiana to this country, by
France, in 1803, may have some bearing on this
question. The article referred to provides, "that the
inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated
into the Union, and enjoy all the advantages of citizens
of the United States, and in the mean time they shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property, and the religion they profess."
As slavery existed in Louisiana at the time of the
cession, it is supposed this is a guaranty that there
should be no change in its condition.
The answer to this is, in the first place, that such a
subject does not belong to the treaty-making power;
and any such arrangement would have been nugatory.
And, in the second place, by no admissible
construction can the guaranty be carried further than
the protection of property in slaves at that time in the
ceded territory. And this has been complied with. The
organization of the slave States of Louisiana, Missouri,
and Arkansas, embraced every slave in Louisiana at
141. Id. at 556-57.
142. Id. at 557.
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the time of the cession. This removes every ground of
objection under the treaty. There is therefore no
pretence, growing out of the treaty, that any part of the
territory of Louisiana, as ceded, beyond the organized
States, is slave territory.'43
Finally, McLean dissented on grounds based upon principles
of private international law:
The law, where a contract is made and is to be
executed, governs it. This does not depend upon
comity, but upon the law of the contract. And if, in the
language of the Supreme Court of Missouri, the
master, by taking his slave to Illinois, and employing
him there as a slave, emancipates him as effectually as
by a deed of emancipation, is it possible that such an
act is not a matter for adjudication in any slave State
where the master may take him? Does not the master
assent to the law, when he places himself under it in a
free State?
The States of Missouri and Illinois are bounded by a
common line. The one prohibits slavery, the other
admits it. This has been done by the exercise of that
sovereign power which appertains to each. We are
bound to respect the institutions of each, as emanating
from the voluntary action of the people. Have the
people of either any right to disturb the relations of the
other? Each State rests upon the basis of its own
sovereignty, protected by the Constitution. Our Union
has been the foundation of our prosperity and national
glory. Shall we not cherish and maintain it? This can
only be done by respecting the legal rights of each
State.' 44
The last and longest of all nine opinions is the dissent of Mr.
Justice Benjamin Curtis (1809-1874),1 4' a Harvard-educated
Massachusetts lawyer. Importantly, Curtis, a Whig, directly
contradicted Chief Justice Taney's and Justice Daniel's historical and
legal assertions that African Americans had never been and could
never be citizens of the States or of the United States under the
143. Id.
144. Id. at 558.
145. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 564-633 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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Constitution for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts:
To determine whether any free persons, descended
from Africans held in slavery, were citizens of the
United States under the Confederation, and
consequently at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, it is only necessary
to know whether any such persons were citizens either
of the States under the Confederation, at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution.
Of this there can be no doubt. At the time of the
ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free
native-born inhabitants of the States of New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
and North Carolina, though descended from African
slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such
of them as had the other necessary qualifications
possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms
with other citizens. 14
6
A large part of Justice Curtis's dissent is then devoted to the
status of free African Americans at the time of the Revolution and the
making of the Constitution and to a legal analysis of the
Constitution. 47 Since "in five of the thirteen original States, colored
persons then possessed the elective franchise, and were among those
by whom the Constitution was ordained and established," the
Constitution was not "made exclusively by the white race" but also
for "free colored persons" for the benefit of, as the Constitution says,
"themselves and their posterity."'' 48  Accordingly on this issue, he
concluded "[t]hat as free colored persons born within some of the
States are citizens of those States, such persons are also citizens of the
United States" with "the right to sue and is liable to be sued in the
Federal courts, as a citizen of that State in which he resides."' 149
Curtis then addressed the duty of Missouri to recognize the
new status of Dred Scott as a free man. 5 ° It is in this discussion that
Justice Curtis turned in great detail to international law:
146. Id. at 572-73.
147. Id. at 573-88.
148. Id. at 582.
149. Id. at 588.
150. Id. at 588-604.
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The inquiry to be made on this part of the case is,
therefore, whether the State of Missouri has, by its
statute, or its customary law, manifested its will to
displace any rule of international law, applicable to a
change of the status of a slave, by foreign law.
I have not heard it suggested there was any statute of
the State of Missouri bearing on this question. The
customary law of Missouri is the common law,
introduced by statute in 1816. (1 Ter. Laws, 436). And
the common law, as Blackstone says, (4 Com., 67,)
adopts, in its full extent, the law of nations, and holds
it to be a part of the law of the land.
I know of no sufficient warrant for declaring that any
rule of international law, concerning the recognition, in
that State, of a change of status, wrought by an extra-
territorial law, has been displaced or varied by the will
of the State of Missouri.
1 51
Curtis then asked "what the rules of international law
prescribe concerning the change of status of the plaintiff wrought by
the law of the Territory of Wisconsin" and "whether the operation of
the laws of the Territory of Wisconsin upon the status of the plaintiff
was or was not such an operation as these principles of international
law require other States to recognise and allow effect to."'52 In this
part of his dissent, Curtis concluded:
First. The rules of international law respecting the
emancipation of slaves, by the rightful operation of the
laws of another State or country upon the status of the
slave, while resident in such foreign State or country,
are part of the common law of Missouri, and have not
been abrogated by any statute law of that State.
Second. The laws of the United States, constitutionally
enacted, which operated directly on and changed the
status of a slave coming into the Territory of
Wisconsin with his master, who went thither to reside
for an indefinite length of time, in the performance of
his duties as an officer of the United States, had a
rightful operation on the status of the slave, and it is in
151. Id.at595.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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conformity with the rules of international law that this
change of status should be recognised everywhere.153
Curtis then considered the constitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise. 54 There might at one time have been doubts "whether
the Constitution had conferred on the executive department of the
Government of the United States power to acquire territory by a
treaty.""' However,
[W]hatever doubts may then have existed, the question
must now be taken to have been settled. Four distinct
acquisitions of foreign territory have been made by as
many different treaties, under as many different
Administrations. Six States, formed on such territory,
are now in the Union. Every branch of this
Government, during a period of more than fifty years,
has participated in these transactions. To question
their validity now, is vain. As was said by Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, in the American Insurance Company
v. Canter, (1 Peters, 542,) "the Constitution confers
absolutely on the Government of the Union the powers
of making war and of making treaties; consequently,
that Government possesses the power of acquiring
territory, either by conquest or treaty."' 156
Curtis went on to find support for the power of Congress to
legislate in new, as well as original, U.S. territory in the
Constitution's Article IV, Section 3: "Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."'' 57 He
rejected the notion that "all needful Rules and Regulations" did not
mean "all" and cited the history of Congress' regulation of slavery in
the territories. 158
But did the Fifth Amendment, protecting persons from the
deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
limit the right of Congress to abolish slavery, because slave owners
would be deprived of their property in the territories? 5 1 Curtis began
153. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 605-33.
155. Id. at 612.
156. Id. at 613.
157. Id. at 613-15.
158. Id. at 615-24.
159. Id. at 624.
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his answer by arguing, as did Judge Mansfield in Somerset, that
"[s]lavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by
municipal law."' 6 °
[P]ersons held to service under the laws of a State are
property only to the extent and under the conditions
fixed by those laws; that they must cease to be
available as property, when their owners voluntarily
place them permanently within another jurisdiction,
where no municipal laws on the subject of slavery
exist ... ?"'
Curtis believed that this rule was known to those who drafted and
implemented the Constitution:
Is it conceivable that the Constitution has conferred the
right on every citizen to become a resident on the
territory of the United States with his slaves, and there
to hold them as such, but has neither made nor
provided for any municipal regulations which are
essential to the existence of slavery?
Is it not more rational to conclude that they who
framed and adopted the Constitution were aware that
persons held to service under the laws of a State are
property only to the extent and under the conditions
fixed by those laws; that they must cease to be
available as property, when their owners voluntarily
place them permanently within another jurisdiction,
where no municipal laws on the subject of slavery
exist. 162
Finally, Curtis turned to the Treaty of 1803 ceding Louisiana
from France to the United States. Curtis rejected the principle that
any treaty could limit the provisions of the U.S. Constitution:
By a treaty with a foreign nation, the United States
may rightfully stipulate that the Congress will or will
not exercise its legislative power in some particular
manner, on some particular subject. Such promises,
when made, should be voluntarily kept, with the most
scrupulous good faith. But that a treaty with a foreign
160. Id.
161. Id. at 625.
162. Id.
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nation can deprive the Congress of any part of the
legislative power conferred by the people, so that it no
longer can legislate as it was empowered by the
Constitution to do, I more than doubt.
The powers of the Government do and must remain
unimpaired. The responsibility of the Government to a
foreign nation, for the exercise of those powers, is
quite another matter. That responsibility is to be met,
and justified to the foreign nation, according to the
requirements of the rules of public law; but never upon
the assumption that the United States had parted with
or restricted any power of acting according to its own
free will, governed solely by its own appreciation of its
duty. 163
So what is the effect of treaties on U.S. domestic law? Curtis
went on to say:
The second section of the fourth article is, "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties
made or which shall be made under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."
This has made treaties part of our municipal law; but it
has not assigned to them any particular degree of
authority, nor declared that laws so enacted shall be
irrepealable. No supremacy is assigned to treaties over
acts of Congress. That they are not perpetual, and
must be in some way repealable, all will agree."
Hence:
If, therefore, it were admitted that the treaty between
the United States and France did ... exclude slavery
from so much of the ceded territory as is now in
question, this court could not declare that an act of
Congress excluding it was void by force of the treaty.
Whether or not a case existed sufficient to justify a
refusal to execute such a stipulation, would not be a
judicial, but a political and legislative question, wholly
beyond the authority of this court to try and determine.
It would belong to diplomacy and legislation, and not
163. Id. at 629.
164. Id.
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to the administration of existing laws. Such a
stipulation in a treaty, to legislate or not to legislate in
a particular way, has been repeatedly held in this court
to address itself to the political or the legislative
power, by whose action thereon this court is bound.
(Foster v. Nicolson [sic] 2 Peters, 314; Garcia v. Lee,
12 Peters, 519).65
In any case, Curtis felt the 1803 Treaty "contains no
stipulation in any manner affecting the action of the United States
respecting the territory in question."' 66  Curtis could not see that
France would have an interest "in uninhabited territory" beyond "the
present State of Missouri [which] was then a wilderness, uninhabited
save by savages, whose possessory title had not then been
extinguished."' 67 Moreover, not only did the United States in law and
in fact protect the "individual rights of the then inhabitants of the
territory, ' but "the stipulation was temporary and ceased to have
any effect when the then inhabitants of the Territory of Louisiana, in
whose behalf the stipulation was made, were incorporated into the
Union."169
III. SOME POSSIBLE LESSONS
Ever since 1840 and the publication of the second volume of
Alexis de Tocqueville's classic exposition of America, De la
Dgmocratie en Amerique, it has been argued that the American
experience has been and will be "exceptional," essentially different
from other democratic peoples. 7 °  Rereading Dred Scott, we
recognize that American "exceptionalism" has not always been
glorious. It would be well, if painful, for us to remember this. It is
hard to say how much any nation will learn from its own history. At
least, we can hope not to make too many of the same mistakes as our
165. Id. at 630.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 631.
169. Id. at 632.
170. The exact phrase is "La situation des Am~ricains est donc enti~rement
exceptionnelle, et il est A croire qu'aucun peuple dfmocratique n'y sera jamais plac."
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVlLLE, 2 DE LA DtMOCRATIE EN AMtRIQUE 49 (Flammarion ed. 1981). A
rough English translation might be: "The situation of the Americans is thus entirely
exceptional, and it is to be believed that no other democratic people will ever be similarly
placed."
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predecessors. What ought we modem Americans learn from Dred
Scott and our "exceptional" international legal experience with our
"peculiar institution," American slavery?
In the earliest decades of the American Republic, jurists-
Kent and Wheaton-and lawyers and judges-Jefferson, Madison,
Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, and Story-were keen to show that the
United States was ready to participate in the making and application
of international law in good faith as an upstanding full member of
international society. But the crisis surrounding American slavery
opened up an international legal can of worms for Nineteenth Century
American lawyers and judges. International law, alongside the public
law of European countries like Britain and France, was turning away
from even a cringing embrace of slavery. By the time of Dred Scott
in 1857, it could well be said that the preponderance of international
legal argument condemned slavery, including American slavery, as
illegal.
What could Americans then say or do? McLean and Curtis,
the two dissenting judges in Dred Scott, were, of course, buoyed by
the trends in international law. They could and did employ
international law arguments to prove that Dred Scott was both a
citizen of Missouri and a free man. However, for those making up
Dred Scott's majority, international law posed a threat to the
increasingly internationally unpopular U.S. practice of slavery.
Nelson and Campbell approached the international legal hurdle
gingerly, arguing from territorial jurisdictional principles of private
international law, that, whether morally right or wrong, Missouri pro-
slavery law had primacy. Justice Taney, in language echoed by more
modem American judges, explicitly rejected applying international
legal rules because "the law of nations [could not stand] between the
people of the United States and their Government." He relied instead
on his assertion that the U.S. Constitution protected the property
rights in slaves held by slave masters. Daniel went hatefully further,
putting the international law of the time on its head, hoping to prove
that international legal principles showed slaves and descendants of
slaves could never be part of a social contract establishing a sovereign
state. Catron, more plausibly and creatively, argued that America's
1803 treaty with France secured rights for slave owners in the
Louisiana Territory protected by the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause, a proposition refuted by Curtis.
Professor Detlev Vagts has seen in Justice Curtis's language
in Dred Scott and in a Curtis judgment on circuit in 1855... the
171. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. MAss. 1855), aff'd on other grounds, 67
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origins of the later-in-time rule now used to settle conflicts between
treaties and statutes in U.S. constitutional law. 172 The 1888 Whitney
case provides the usual statement of the last-in-time rule:
By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy
is given to either over the other. When the two relate
to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either; but if the
two are inconsistent: the one last in date will control
the other, provided, always, the stipulation of the treaty
on the subject is self-executing. 73
Curtis's doctrine may be an unhappy residue of Dred Scott.
Professor Vagts laments how what was once simply a rule for the
courts has been now adopted by the Congress, the President and
"influential commentators" as a "final answer and that [accordingly]
the binding effect of international law carries little weight."'74 For
example, "[t]he commitment of the United States to its treaty
obligations has recently been put in question by two persistent
histories of treaty violation-the refusal to pay U.S. United Nations
dues... and the repeated failure to advise alien prisoners of their
rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations," thus
"jeopardiz[ing] the conduct of our foreign affairs."' 75 This may be
rather too much American exceptionalism for international law to
swallow.
Even more unfortunate, arguments such as those of Taney,
Nelson, Daniel, Campbell, and Catron attempting to limit the impact
of antislavery opinion in international law and foreign public law
foreshadow modern legal expressions of American exceptionalism.
The comparisons to assertions of modern American foreign policy
exceptionalism are all too plain. As Professor Peter Spiro explains in
his article about modern American exceptionalists, "At the center of
their thinking stands the edifice of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this
U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
172. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 314-15 (2001).
173. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
174. Vagts, supra note 172, at 313.
175. Id.
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conception, calls for America to resist the incorporation of
international norms and drapes the power to do so in the mantle of
constitutional legitimacy.' 1 76  Spiro's critique of American
exceptionalism, published during the Clinton Administration, has
been sharpened into a critique of the American approach towards
international human rights law during the Bush Administration. 177
As mentioned briefly at the outset, Dean Koh has written that
"particularly since World War II, and the emergence of the
international human rights movement, the United States has been
criticized for the gap between its stated human rights principles and
its political actions."'78 In a literal sense, Dean Koh's observation
must be true: there was little to international human rights law
propria dictum before World War II. The presumption of state
sovereignty shielded most international state action vis-a-vis
individuals from the outside scrutiny of international law. It was only
the atrocities of Nazi-occupied Europe that persuaded the large part of
international public and legal opinion to recognize international
human rights claims of individuals against their own governments.'79
Hence, any criticism of a gap between American rhetoric and practice
respecting international human rights law would have had to come in
the post-World War II era.
However, as we have just seen, well before the time of
acceptance of the possibility of a discipline of international human
rights law, there was both U.S. rhetoric and practice about an issue,
slavery, that nowadays surely is characterized as part and parcel of
international human rights law. Moreover, there were also
international criticisms of the gap between U.S. rhetoric and our
practice. Indeed, probably at no time in U.S. history was the gap
between our human rights rhetoric and our human rights practice so
great as it was in 1857 when Dred Scott was decided. It is worth
taking into consideration that there is a history of U.S. judges
disregarding international and foreign opinion and that, at least in the
case of Dred Scott, that history is nothing of which to be proud today.
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